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Will R.'s avatar

A really interesting piece that challenges one of the most taken-for-granted assumptions inside a lot of Marxist discourse: that “metaphysics” simply means rigid, anti-dialectical thinking. The strongest part of the piece is probably the historical point that Marxism never actually escaped metaphysics in any meaningful sense, it simply developed a different kind of metaphysics grounded in motion, contradiction, relationality, and material development.

The discussion of Aristotle and Hegel is especially useful here. Too often “metaphysics” gets treated in Marxist circles as a vague insult rather than a serious philosophical category with its own long and complicated history. You're right that once humans move beyond immediate sensory experience into conceptual thought, abstraction, and explanation, some form of metaphysical reasoning is already taking place. Even supposedly anti-metaphysical traditions usually smuggle in unexamined assumptions about causality, matter, history, or human nature.

At the same time, I think there’s still an important unresolved tension in the article around what exactly distinguishes a “dialectical materialist metaphysics” from simply a philosophical ontology or worldview more broadly. Part of the historical Marxist suspicion toward metaphysics came from opposition to static systems detached from historical movement and social practice. So the question becomes whether reclaiming the term “metaphysics” clarifies Marxism, or risks reintroducing precisely the kinds of abstract speculation earlier Marxists were trying to move beyond.

I've actually just released a podcast on a similar topic, covering Hegel: 'The Meaning of Marxism' - I'd love to hear some feedback if you get some time to give it a listen - it's in my posts.

Plastic Paddy's avatar

Admittedly coming from a place of ignorance, I've read in the Vietnamese "Curriculum of the Basic Principles of Marxism-Leninism" (translated by Luna Nguyen, 2023) that metaphysics contradicts dialectical materialism because it tends to "view nature as a collection of objects and phenomena which are isolated from one another and fundamentally unchanging" (page 8), where dialectics "seeks to view the world in terms of relationships, motion, and change" (page 9). At least in the framework of the writers, these philosophies are fundamentally oppossed.

I'm not sure why making an arbitrary divide between good and bad metaphysics would be an improvement from saying that Aristotle sometimes thought dialectically, and sometimes metaphysically. Should we make our distinctions by what philosophers thought of themselves as, or by how we understand them today? As long as we're not being reductive and using the label "metaphysics" to deflect from what we can't argue against, isn't calling something metaphysical a valid critique if we mean that it is treating an object or phenomena as "isolated and fundamentally unchanging"?

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